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DREW FUDENBERG AND DAVID K. LEVINE
We study repeated games with frequent actions and frequent imperfect public
signals, where the signals are aggregates of many discrete events, such as sales or
tasks. The high-frequency limit of the equilibrium set depends both on the proba-
bility law governing the discrete events and on how many events are aggregated
into a single signal. When the underlying events have a binomial distribution,
the limit equilibria correspond to the equilibria of the associated continuous-time
game with diffusion signals, but other event processes that aggregate to a diffusion
limit can have a different set of limit equilibria. Thus the continuous-time game
need not be a good approximation of the high-frequency limit when the underlying
events have three or more possible values.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study the limits of equilibria of repeated games with im-
perfect public information as the frequency of observations and
actions grows to inﬁnity. To highlight the role of the information
structure, we focus games between one long-run player and a se-
quence of short-run opponents, as in the classic Klein and Lefﬂer
(1981) model of a long-run ﬁrm facing a sequence of consumers,
each of whom purchases only once. In the Klein-Lefﬂer model, in
each period the ﬁrm chooses an intended quality level, but the
production process is stochastic, so that the realized quality may
differ from the intended one.1 Consumers will only purchase if
the ﬁrm is expected to try to produce high quality in the current
period; the ﬁrm has a short-run incentive to cut costs and produce
low quality, but there can be equilibria in which the ﬁrm tries for
high quality to avoid losing future sales.2 As a second illustration,
the nonstrategic players could be shareholders, and the long-run
player the manager of the ﬁrm. The manager chooses an effort
level, but this is not observed by the shareholders, who do observe
the realized sales in each period. Because the long-run player’s
action is observed with noise, the set of equilibria depends on the
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1. In the original Klein-Lefﬂer model, the production technology was deter-
ministic.
2. The key aspect of these “short-run players” is that they are strategically
myopic and do not try to inﬂuence the future play of the long run player. The
same analysis applies when the “short-run players” are replaced by a continuum of
inﬁnitesimal long-lived players, with the large player observing only the aggregate
play of the small ones.
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information structure, and typically efﬁcient payoffs cannot be ap-
proximated by equilibria, even in the limit as the discount factor
tends to 1 (Fudenberg and Levine 1994).
We show how the best equilibrium payoff for the long-run
player depends on the information structure, and in turn on how
the relevant characteristics of the information structure change
as the observation period shrinks.3 Our work builds on our earlier
paper Fudenberg and Levine (2007a), which provides general con-
ditions for a sequence of discrete-time games with period length
going to zero to have a nontrivial limit equilibrium. Using the
general result from the earlier paper, we can reduce the study of
the limit equilibria to the analysis of the “asymptotic informative-
ness” of the signal structure. The per-event informativeness is all
that matters if players observe each event separately, yet many
processes with different per-event informativeness converge to
the same diffusions. This is why the equilibria of the controlled-
diffusion case can be different than the limit equilibria. In some
cases, frequent interactions permit fully efﬁcient outcomes, for
example, if consumers receive such accurate information that the
ﬁrm can be induced to almost always produce high quality. In
other cases, the equilibrium set collapses in the limit, and only
the static equilibrium can be supported, so that the ﬁrm produces
low quality forever.
We focus on cases where the public signal is an aggregate of
several or many discrete events, such as sales, price changes, or
components of quality, and in particular on the case where the dis-
tributionofthisaggregateconvergestoadiffusionprocess.Wefeel
that this is of relevance for interpreting results about continuous
time games where players observe the state of a diffusion pro-
cess, as in Faingold and Sannikov (2007), Fudenberg and Levine
(2007a), Sannikov (2007a), and Sannikov and Skrypcaz (2008),
because in most settings of interest the diffusion assumption is
an approximation for a sum of discrete events.4
We examine various ways of sending the time period of the
game to zero and passing to a continuous-time limit. Our main
point is that these limits all correspond to the idea that players
act “very frequently,” but the same limiting signal distribution
3. In more general games, the set of equilibrium payoffs will depend on the
information structure in more complicated ways, but our calculation of the “limit
informativeness” of various sequences of signal structures will still apply.
4. Diffusion processes are continuous, yet processes such as sales or price are
inherently discrete, and so players would observe at most a single transaction in
each period if they monitored the process at a sufﬁciently high frequency.REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 235
may correspond to ways of passing to the limit that have very dif-
ferent limit equilibria. We also highlight the role of “information
aggregation”indeterminingthelimitequilibriumpayoffs.Thatis,
we ask when observing the sum of many signals leads to a larger
limit equilibrium set than observing the signals one at a time. Our
previous paper showed that there are efﬁcient limit equilibria if
deviations increase the volatility of the diffusion but not when
deviations decrease the volatility. We relate the differing conclu-
sions in these two cases to their differing aggregation properties:
when deviating leads to increased volatility, the signal structure
is more informative when players observe the aggregate of the
discrete events instead of observing each event as it occurs, and
the informativeness becomes inﬁnite as players aggregate more
and more observations; this is not the case when deviating lowers
volatility. Finally, our results show that the usual continuous-time
games with controlled diffusions correspond to some but not all
of the ways that the discrete-time observation structures can con-
verge to a diffusion, so the standard continuous-time model is “too
small” to incorporate all of the relevant limit objects.5
Like the earlier paper, this one is related to that of Abreu,
Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), who studied the strongly symmetric
pure-strategy equilibria of a repeated partnership game in dis-
crete time when players observe the realization of a Poisson pro-
cess. Our work is also similar to that of Sannikov and Skrypacz
(2008). They consider a game with two long-run players observing
the inﬁnite-dimensional sample path of a continuous-time L´ evy
processatdiscreteintervalsandprovideanupperboundontheset
of pure-strategy equilibrium payoffs as the time interval shrinks
to zero. Instead of considering games with two long-run players,
we study a game with a single long-run player facing a sequence
of short-run opponents, each of whom plays only once but knows
about past outcomes. This is also the case in Faingold and San-
nikov (2007) and Sannikov and Skrypacz (2007). Unlike those
papers, we allow mixed as well as pure strategies and explicitly
consider the limit of equilibria when signals are an aggregate of
underlying underying discrete-time events.
Our work is related to papers that construct a series of
discrete-time games whose limit equilibria correspond to the equi-
libria of the continuous-time game with diffusion signals, as in
5. Thissuggeststhatonemightwanttoconstructalargerspaceofcontinuous-
time games, as done by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Simon and Stinchcombe
(1989) in a related context, but that remains a topic for future work.236 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I
STAGE-GAME PAYOFFS
Player 2
Out In
Player 1 +1 u,0 ¯ u,1
−1 u,0 ¯ u+ g, −1
Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) and Sannikov (2007b). The main dif-
ference is in focus: The earlier papers are in the spirit of a lower
hemicontinuity argument, showing that there exists a sequence of
discrete-time games that provide a foundation for the limit game;
our work points to, loosely speaking, a failure of upper hemicon-
tinuity.
On a more practical level, the equilibria of games played
at high but ﬁnite frequency depends on the informativeness
of the available signals. Even when these signals can be well
approximated by a diffusion, the equilibria of the standard con-
tinuous time models may not be a good approximation of the
ﬁnite-frequency equilibria, unless the underlying signal process
is binomial. Otherwise, whether or not the continuous time re-
sults are relevant is an empirical issue and is not a necessary
consequence of the periods being short.
II. THE MODEL
A long-run player 1 plays a stage game with a short-run
player 2 who is completely impatient. To focus attention on the
information-theoretic aspects of the problem, we restrict attention
to the 2 × 2 stage game shown in Table I, where u < ¯ u and g > 0.
In the stage game, player 2 plays Out in every Nash equilibrium,
so player 1’s static Nash equilibrium payoff is u,w h i c hi sa l s o
the minmax payoff for player 1. Naturally player 1 would prefer
that player 2 play In, but he can only induce player 2 to play In
by avoiding playing −1. The highest feasible payoff for player 1
is ¯ u+ g. The Stackelberg payoff of ¯ u+ g/2 can be obtained by a
publicly observed commitment to play the mixed strategy (1/2,
1/2) but the highest repeated game payoff is ¯ u when actions are
observed (Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin 1990) and the highest
payoff with imperfect public monitoring is strictly less than that
(Fudenberg and Levine 1994). Our focus will be on determining
when the repeated game with vanishingly small time periods has
equilibria with normalized discounted payoffs that exceed u,a n dREPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 237
when it has equilibria with payoffs approaching ¯ u, which we refer
to as the “ﬁrst-best” payoff.
When the game is repeated, the length of a period is τ,a n dt h e
subjective continuous-time interest rate for the long-run player is
r, so that her rate of time discount is δ = e−rτ. Each period, the
stage game is played, and then the long-run player and subse-
quentshort-runplayersobserveapublicsignal z ∈ Rthatdepends
only on the action a1 of the long-run player. The public signal has
ﬁnite support; its distribution is described by the density function
f(z | a1,τ). In addition, we assume that the support of the signal
is independent of the action played, so that every possible signal
has positive probability under every action.
There is also a publicly observed public randomization device
each period before actions are taken. The public history is the
history of the signal and the public randomization device.6 Our
solution concept is perfect public equilibrium or PPE: these are
strategy proﬁles for the repeated game in which (a) each player’s
strategy depends only on the public information, and (b) no player
wants to deviate at any public history.7
The characterization of perfect public equilibria in this set-
ting is straightforward, using standard dynamic programming
techniques in the spirit of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990).
Because we allow public randomization, the set of perfect public
equilibrium payoffs to LR is a line segment between a best and
worst equilibrium; because the static Nash equilibrium involves
noentryandgivesLRherminmax,theworstequilibriumisforLR
togetu.SothesetofPPEpayoffstotheLRplayeriscompletelyde-
scribed by its upper bound, which we denote by v∗.8 Proposition 1
in Appendix I shows that v∗ can be computed as the solution to
a static linear programming problem, where the control variables
6. Technically speaking, the public information also includes the short-run
player’s action, but because public randomizations are available, we can restrict
attention to strategies that ignore the past actions of the short-run player and
obtain the same set of outcomes of perfect public equilibria. To see this, ob-
serve that continuation payoffs can always be arranged by a public randomiza-
tion between the best and worst equilibria. If continuation payoffs depend on the
play of the short-run player, the long-run player cares only about the expected
value conditional on the signal of his own play. Because that expected value
lies between the best and worst equilibria, there is an equivalent equilibrium
in which the continuation value is constant and equal to the conditional expected
value.
7. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a deﬁnition of this concept and an
example of a nonpublic equilibrium in a game with public monitoring.
8. The arguments of Fudenberg and Levine (1983) or Abreu, Pearce, and
Stachetti (1990) can be adapted to show that the set of PPE payoffs in this game
is compact, so the best PPE payoff is well-deﬁned.238 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
are the “continuation payoffs” w(z) that the player expects to re-
ceive following each signal z; this result is used in the proof of our
ﬁrst proposition.
Now suppose that the continuation payoffs are restricted to
the two values v∗ (“reward”) and u(“punishment”). Deﬁne pas the
probability of punishment when the action chosen is +1 (that is,
p is the probability under action +1 of signals such that continu-
ation play is “punishment”) and deﬁne q as the probability of the
punishment outcome when the action chosen is −1. We say that
ap a i r(p,q)i sfeasible if it can be generated by some speciﬁcation
of the function w.
PROPOSITION 1( F UDENBERG AND LEVINE 2007A).
(a) For a ﬁxed discount factor δ, there is an equilibrium with
the long-run player’s payoff above uif and only if there are
feasible p,q ∈ [0,1] that satisfy
(¯ u− u)
g
(q − p)
p
− 1 ≥
(1 − δ)
δp
. (1)
In this case the highest PPE payoff to the long-run player
is
max
p,qfeasible
¯ u−
pg
q − p
. (2)
When (1) is not satisﬁed, the highest PPE payoff is u.
(b) There is a PPE that supports the highest PPE payoff that
has the “cutoff likelihood property:” There is a cutoff λ∗
such that if
f(z | a1 =− 1,τ)/f(z | a1 =+1,τ)>λ ∗ thenw(z)=u, if
f(z | a1 =− 1,τ)/f(z | a1 =+1,τ)<λ ∗ then w(z)=v∗.9
Note that the best equilibrium v∗ is close to the ﬁrst best if there
are feasible (p,q)w i t hp/(q − p) small.
III. CONTINUOUS-TIME LIMITS
Our interest is in how the set of PPE payoffs varies with the
period length, and in particular its behavior as the time period
shrinks to zero. We thus consider families of games indexed by the
periodlengthτ.Wemustnowdescribehowthesignal zvarieswith
9. Note that when the likelihood ratio is exactly λ∗ the continuation value
may lie anywhere in the interval [u,v∗].REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 239
the period length τ. Our basic scenario is that z is an aggregate of
discrete random variables representing, for example, sales, prices,
or other transaction data.10 Speciﬁcally, we suppose that z is the
sum of some number of “events,” by which we mean independent
identically distributed random variables Zj whose support is a
ﬁxed ﬁnite set, regardless of the action proﬁle.
Recall that the length of a period, that is, the time between
moves, is τ; the “observation frequency” we mentioned in the In-
troduction is thus 1/τ. We assume that the length of time between
events (that is, between realizations of the Zj)i s  ≤ τ,s ot h a t
the event frequency is 1/ . We are interested in the case in which
τ → 0 (implying that   → 0 as well). It is convenient to assume
that τ is a speciﬁed continuous strictly increasing function of  
with τ(0) = 0. We then deﬁne k( ) = τ( )/ ; players observe the
integer number  k( )  of signals when the time between moves is
τ( ). In general, we allow the distribution of Zj and its support
to depend on  , and to emphasize this dependence we will write
Zj( ). (Recall that this is necessary for the distribution of the ag-
gregate z to approach a diffusion.) However, we will assume that
the cardinality of the support of Zj( ) is a constant, independent
of  .
The information available at the end of the period beginning
at t is the signal z =
  (t+τ)/  
j= t/   Zj( ). Our goal is to character-
ize the set of equilibrium payoffs in the limit. Speciﬁcally, if for
a given interest rate r there are positive ¯ τ and ε such that for
all nonnegative smaller values 0 <τ<¯ τ the game with period
length τ and interest rate r has an equilibrium with payoff at
least u+ ε, we say that there is a nontrivial limit equilibrium
for r. If there is any positive interest rate r for which there is a
nontrivial limit equilibrium, we say simply that there is a non-
trivial limit equilibrium. If for all r > 0 and all sequences τ → 0
the equilibrium payoff converges to u, we say there is only a triv-
ial limit. (In principle there can be cases where the limit depends
on the sequence chosen; however, we do not provide names for
these cases.) If there is an ¯ r > 0 such that for all 0 < r < ¯ r,a l l
ε>0, and all sequences τ → 0, there is a sequence of equilibria
with payoff converging to ¯ u− ε, we say there is an efﬁcient limit
equilibrium. If for all (τ,r) → (0,0) there are equilibria that have
10. This model does not capture the case where the signal involves an occa-
sional catastrophic event, such as a failed surgery, a bad reaction to a drug, or
an airplane crash. That type of signal is better modeled in continuous time as a
Poisson process. See Celentani, Levine, and Martinelli (2007).240 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
payoffs converging to ¯ u, we say that there is an efﬁcient patient
equilibrium.11
The following corollaries all apply to sequences of equilibria
for the games indexed by observation period τ. First, for each
ﬁxed τ we deﬁne ρ(τ) = (q(τ) − p(τ))/p(τ), which we may view as
the signal-to-noise ratio for the speciﬁed equilibrium. From (2) we
see that if v∗(τ) > u, then it must be that
ρ(τ) >
g
¯ u− u
.
We also see that in order for the payoffs to converge to ¯ u it must
be that limτ→0 ρ(τ) →∞ ; it will be helpful to remember that
limτ→0 ρ(τ) →∞implies p(τ) → 0.
COROLLARY 1.12
(a) If for some sequence (r,τ) → (0,0) there is no sequence
of equilibria with ρ(τ) →∞ , then there is not an efﬁcient
patient equilibrium.
(b) If for all r > 0, all sequences τ → 0, and all equilibria,
ρ(τ) → 0, then there is only a trivial limit equilibrium.
(c) If for all r > 0 and all sequences τ → 0 there are an ε>0
and a sequence of equilibria with
ρ(τ) >
g
¯ u− u
+ ε
and p(τ) bounded away from 0, there is a nontrivial limit
equilibrium for any r.
The ﬁrst two parts of this result are immediate. Part (c) fol-
lows from the observation that ρ(τ) >
g
¯ u−u implies that the LHS of
(1) is positive, so limτ→0 v∗(τ) > u in cases where the RHS of (1)
converges to 0, which is true in particular when p(τ) is bounded
away from 0.
11. Note that the deﬁnition of a nontrivial limit equilibrium allows the in-
terest rate r to be arbitrarily small, but it requires the payoff in question to be
supportable as an equilibrium when that interest rate is held ﬁxed as the period
length τ goes to 0. The deﬁnition of an efﬁcient patient equilibrium allows the
interest rate to go to 0 as well. However, the efﬁcient payoff must be attained
in the limit regardless of the relative rates at which τ and r converge, so that,
in particular, efﬁciency must be obtained if we ﬁrst send τ to 0 with r ﬁxed and
only then decrease r. The other order of limits, with r becoming small for ﬁxed τ,
corresponds to the usual folk-theorem analysis in discrete-time games.
12. Our earlier paper states a result with the same conclusion under the
additional hypothesis that the sequence of equilibria is “regular,” meaning that
ρ(τ)a n d( q(τ) − p(τ))/τ both converge.REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 241
In many cases of interest, the best equilibria will have p(τ)
converging to 0.
COROLLARY 2.
(a) If for allr > 0 and all sequences τ → 0, along any sequence
of best equilibria ρ(τ) > g/(¯ u− u) implies q/τ → 0, then
there is only a trivial limit.13
(b) If for every θ>0 and every sequence (r,τ) → (0,0) there
is a sequence of equilibria with q(τ)/τ ≥ θ and ρ(τ) →∞ ,
then there is an efﬁcient patient equilibrium.
(c) If there is an ¯ r > 0 such that for all 0 < r < ¯ r, every λ>1,
and every sequence τ → 0 there is a sequence of equilibria
with p(τ) constant and limτ→0 q(τ)/p(τ) = λ, then there is
an efﬁcient limit equilibrium.
Proof. We can rewrite (1) as
(¯ u− u)
g
ρ − 1 ≥
rν(τ)
p/τ
,
where ν(τ) = (erτ − 1)/rτ converges to 1 as τ → 0. Because ρ =
(q − p)/p, p = q/(ρ + 1), (1) is equivalent to
q
τ
≥
ρ + 1
(¯ u−u)
g ρ − 1
r.
The RHS of this inequality is bounded below by
rg
¯ u−u,t ow h i c hi t
converges as ρ →∞ .
This immediately yields parts (a) and (b). For (c), note that
when λ is sufﬁciently large, the LHS of (1) is positive and bounded
away from 0; the RHS converges to 0, so using the strategies that
generate these probabilities yields a nontrivial limit equilibrium,
and the payoff to this equilibrium converges to ¯ u as λ →∞
IV. CONVERGING TO DIFFUSIONS
We now restrict attention to information processes that con-
verge to diffusion processes in the limit, because we want to re-
late this limit to the predictions of continuous-time controlled-
diffusion models. The idea is that the diffusion process reﬂects
13. The best equilibrium payoff exists for each τ, but there may be multiple
equilibria with this payoff.242 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
the aggregation of information, with the limiting normal distribu-
tion arising from central limit theory.
Our basic diffusion hypothesis is that for each ﬁxed action i =
+1,−1 of the long-run player the sum z =
  t/  
j=1 Zj( ) converges
to a diffusion as   → 0. That is, in the limit   → 0, when the long-
run player’s action is held ﬁxed from time 0 to any timet, the value
of the observed signal at time t is a normally distributed random
variable with mean µit and standard deviation σ2
i t. We continue
to assume that the support of the z’s is independent of the action
chosen, so that when τ =   and players observe each individual
realization of Zj( ), no outcome perfectly reveals which of the two
actions was played. As   and τ converge to 0, the distribution
of the Zj( ) will change; we let f   denote the Zj( ), and f τ the
density of the aggregate z.
The Zj( ) represent underlying economic events that are be-
ing aggregated. As long as their distribution is well-behaved, the
central limit theorem applies and each of the triangular arrays
converges to a diffusion.14 In fact, many different distributions
on the Zj( ) may generate the same diffusion. Our goal is to un-
derstand whether the limit diffusion is sufﬁcient to characterize
the set of limit equilibria or whether the details of the particular
triangular array matter. In practice, the distribution of the un-
derlying events depends on the situation being modeled. In some
settings it is natural to think of the data as having a binomial
distribution. For example, if the data being observed are sales
data, and the items being sold are cars or refrigerators or other
large durable goods, then it is reasonable to think that a con-
sumer either buys the item or not, but does not buy several at
once. On the other hand, for goods sold by volume or weight, each
individual sale can take on many different values, so the underly-
ing data being aggregated have a nontrivial distribution of their
own.
Wetakeupﬁrstthesimplestcase,wheretheunderlying Zj( )
do in fact follow a binomial distribution. This distribution has the
special feature that its mean and its variance are linked to each
other: the variance is equal to the product of the mean and one
minus the mean. As the next result shows, this link between the
mean and the variance implies that two binomial arrays that
14. The Lindberg-Feller condition for the central limit theorem is that the
Zj( )’shaveﬁnitemeanandvariance;toapplythistoarrays,wheretheprobability
law changes with  , it is sufﬁcient that these bounds hold uniformly in  .REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 243
converge to diffusions and have common outcomes must have the
same volatility.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that the signals are sums of i.i.d. binomi-
als Zj( ) where the common outcomes are x( ) > y( ), and
that the probability of x( ) under action i =+ 1,−1i sαi( )
with lim →0 αi( ) = αi,0 <α i < 1. If under each action i the
sums
  t/  
j=1 Zj( ) converge to a diffusion with drifts µi and
volatilities σ2
i as   → 0, then σ+1 = σ−1.
Proof. In Appendix II.
The equal-volatility case is important because in this case the
equilibrium with respect to the limiting diffusions must be trivial.
This does not necessarily imply that if triangular arrays converge
to limit diffusions with the same volatility the limit equilibria
are trivial. Indeed, the next section gives an example where the
signals converge to equal-volatility diffusions and yet there is an
efﬁcient limit equilibrium. However, the limit equilibrium must
be trivial whenever the variances of the aggregate signals con-
verge to the common limit at a sufﬁciently high rate, and if there
is enough aggregation of signals so that we can apply an appro-
priate variant of the central limit theorem. The next result shows
that the assumption of binomial signals plus some technical as-
sumptions does lead to this result, where the “enough aggregation
of signals” condition is that k( ) = τ( )/  grows quickly enough
so that lim →0 τ( )exp(k( )2/7) →∞ .
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that
(i) lim →0 τ( )exp(k( )2/7) →∞
(ii) the signals are sums of i.i.d. binomials Zj( ), where the
common outcomes are x( ) > y( ), and the probability of
x( ) under action i =+ 1,−1i sαi( ) with lim →0 αi( ) =
αi,0 <α i < 1
(iii) under each action i,
  t/  
j=1 Zj( ) converge to nondegene-
rate diffusions with drifts µi and volatilities σ2
i .
Then all limit equilibria are trivial.
Proof Sketch. The proof isinAppendix III;here isarough out-
line: The idea is to use the central limit theorem and a continuity
argument to extend our earlier result that the limit equilibrium is
trivial when the underlying signal structure is a pair of diffusions
with equal volatility. If we could restrict the analysis to strategies244 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
where the cutoff for punishment was ﬁxed relative to the standard
error of the signal the proof would be straightforward, but we have
to also consider punishment cutoffs that become large relative to
the standard error. This requires us to use a “large deviations”
argument that extends an argument from Feller (1971) from the
sum of i.i.d random variable to the case of triangular arrays.
To understand why this result is needed, recall that the usual
central limit theorem concludes that the probability Fn(x)t h a t
the normalized sum of n draws is below any ﬁxed x converges to
the probability  (x) that a standard normal variable is below x.
Feller’s large deviations argument extends this to give conditions
under which
lim
n→∞
1 − Fn(xn)
1 −  (xn)
= 1
when xn is not ﬁxed but rather limn→∞ xn =∞at a rate slowly
enough so that n−1/6xn → 0. Feller’s result does not directly apply
to our setting, because the distribution of the underlying variables
changes with the period length; we report the extension of his
result to our case of triangular arrays in Fudenberg and Levine
(2007b).
The proof also uses a sharpening of Proposition 2, reported
in Lemma A.1: not only do the two binomial arrays converge to
diffusions with a common volatility, but also the variances of the
two signal processes converge to equality sufﬁciently quickly for
our argument to be valid.
Proposition 3 assumes that lim →0 τ( )exp(k( )2/7) = 0.
Without this condition, we cannot use the normal approximation,
so we do not have a general result. However, one important spe-
cial case is the binomial construction of diffusions found in many
textbooks, such as Stokey (2008). Here x( ) =− y( ) = σ 1/2,
α( ) = .5 + .5µ 1/2/σ, and the triangular array converges to a
diffusion with drift µ and volatility σ2. In this case it is clear
how the assumption that the support of the binomials is the same
under both actions forces the two diffusions to have the same
volatilities, and moreover we can determine what happens when
k is small.
PROPOSITION 4. If the player’s signals are as in the standard bino-
mial construction of diffusions and lim →0 k( )τ( ) = 0, then
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Proof. Assume that the drift µ−1 under action −1 exceeds the
drift µ+1 under action +1. (The case µ−1 <µ +1 is symmetric and
it is obvious that there is only a trivial limit equilibrium when the
drifts are equal.) For any ﬁnite number k of signals, the largest
possible value of ρ = (q − p)/p is obtained with strategies that
punish only if the sum equals kh, so that every realization was +h.
Recall that we must have the case of equal volatilities σ+1 = σ−1.
We compute
ρ =
q − p
p
=
q
p
− 1 =
 
0.5 + 0.5µ−1(τ/k)1/2/σ+1
0.5 + 0.5µ+1(τ/k)1/2/σ+1
 k
− 1.
This goes to zero if the log of the ﬁrst term goes to zero. We
calculate
lim
 →0
k( )log(0.5 + 0.5µ−1[τ( )/k( )]1/2/σ+1)
−k( )log(0.5 + 0.5µ+1[τ( )/k( )]1/2/σ+1)
= lim
 →0
k( )(µ−1[τ( )/k( )]1/2/σ+1 − µ+1[τ( )/k( )]1/2/σ+1)
= lim
 →0
(k( )τ( ))1/2(µ−1 − µ+1)/σ+1 = 0,
where the last equality follows from lim →0 k( )τ( ) = 0. Thus by
Corollary 1b, there is only a trivial limit equilibrium.
Proposition 4’s hypothesis that lim →0 k( )τ( ) = 0 overlaps
with Proposition 3’s hypothesis that lim →0 τ( )exp(k( )2/7) →
∞, so combining the two results gives a complete characterization
of the limit of standard binomials:
COROLLARY 3. If the player’s signals are as in the standard bi-
nomial construction of diffusions, then there are only trivial
limit equilibria.
Torelatethisresulttothepreviousone,andtoourearliergen-
eral analysis, note that when lim →0 k( )τ( ) > 0, the sequence
of strategies “only punish if every outcome was +h” has a limiting
value of ρ that is nonzero. However, along this sequence we have
q/τ → 0, so as Corollary 2a shows, this is no help.
V. TRINOMIAL INFORMATIONAL LIMITS
Although some data, such as sale or no sale, may have a
binomial distribution, other data, such as the number of units
sold, or their price, will generally have more than two values. The246 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
simplest case beyond the binomial is the trinomial: we shall see
that the trinomial breaks the link between the volatilities under
the two different actions, so the equal variance/degenerate limit
case seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Moreover,
in these more general limits, the equilibria of the game with the
limiting diffusion do not correspond to the limit of the equilibria
when the signal is the aggregate of many small events. This sug-
gests that the continuous time game is “too small” to capture all of
the more general ways that signal processes can be approximated
by diffusions.
Fix a pair of drifts µ+1,µ −1 and a pair of volatilities σ2
+1,σ2
−1.
We will construct a particular family of pairs of trinomials such
that each trinomial converges to a diffusion with the correspond-
ing drift and volatility, and use this family to explore various ways
of passing to the continuous time limit. We focus on three simple
cases: a “bad-news” case where the drifts are equal and deviat-
ing increases the volatility; a “good-news” case with equal drifts
where deviating decreases the volatility, and the case of equal
volatilities and unequal drifts.
The pairs of signal processes will be indexed by a free parame-
ter γ that is not determined by the limit diffusions. For any γ ≥ 1,
weset ¯ γ = γ max(σ2
+1,σ2
−1).Nowconsiderapairoftrinomialdistri-
butionswiththesamethreepossibleoutcomes, x =− h( ),0,h( ),
where   is the period length and h( ) = ¯ γ 1/2 1/2. The probability
distributions on the outcomes depend on action i =+ 1,−1a n dγ
as follows: The probability of outcome 0 is αi = (¯ γ − σ2
i )/ ¯ γ, inde-
pendent of   (note that this is always nonnegative and less than
1), and the probability of outcome +h is
βi( ) =
1 − αi
2
+
µi 1/2
2¯ γ 1/2 .
A simple example may help put this in perspective. The
sign of x and the size of the step are simply normalizations,
so that the normalized signals converge to a diffusion, so we
may think of the underlying data as “0 sales” corresponding to
x =− h( ), “a single sale” corresponding to x = 0, and “a double
sale” corresponding to x =+ h( ). Let us focus on the bad-news
case, where σ−1 >σ +1, and take σ−1 = 2,σ +1 = 1a n dγ = 2. Then
¯ γ = 4, α+1 = 3/4,α −1 = 1/2, so that a sale is more likely if action
+1 is taken. Ignoring the “small noise term” of order  1/2,t h e
probability of no sale or a double sale when a =+ 1i s1 /8, andREPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 247
when a =− 1 the probability of no sale or a double sale is 1/4.
That is, action +1 increases the likelihood of a single sale at the
expense of both no sales and double sales.
As we shall see, in both the bad-news and good-news cases,
the per-event informativeness of the individual events is constant
as   → 0. In the bad-news case the informativeness of the best
test, and thus the best limit equilibrium payoff, is independent of
theparameterγ.However,inthegood-newscaseγ determinesthe
informativenessofthebesttestandalsothebestlimitequilibrium
payoff.
The good- and bad-news cases also differ in their aggregation
properties: In the bad-news case, aggregating more signals leads
to a more informative test; so that when k = τ/ →∞the best
equilibrium approaches full efﬁciency; which is the result when
players observe a diffusion. In the good-news case, aggregating
more signals can lead to a less informative test, and the effect of
aggregation is ambiguous and depends on the “free” parameter
γ.
To analyze the trinomial example, we begin by computing the
means and variances. We let Ei denote the expectation conditional
on action i. Then the expected values of the trinomial distribution
described above are
Ei[Zj( )] = βih+ αi0 + (1 − αi − βi)(−h)
= (2βi − (1 − αi))h
= µi
 1/2
¯ γ 1/2 h = µi
 1/2
¯ γ 1/2 ¯ γ 1/2 1/2 = µi 
and the variances are
Ei[Zj( )2] − (Ei[Zj( )])2 = (1 − αi)h2 − µ2
i  2
= (1 − αi)¯ γ − µ2
i  2 = σ2
i   − µ2
i  2.
Thus if we hold ﬁxed the actions up to a real time t,t h es u mo f
the process up to time t has mean µit and variance σ2
i t − µ2
i t ,
which converges to σ2
i t as   goes to 0. Moreover, if we look at
the sum up to time τ( ), where τ( )/  goes to inﬁnity, we again
have a triangular array, so the position at τ( ) is again described
approximately by a normal.248 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
V.A. Bad-News Case: σ2
−1 >σ 2
+1
In the bad-news case, we can show that if the ratio of volatil-
ities is sufﬁciently large then the limit equilibrium is nontriv-
ial, regardless of the amount of information aggregation. We also
show that if the amount of aggregation, as measured by the ratio
k = τ/ , goes to inﬁnity, then the ﬁrst best can be approximated
arbitrarily closely, so there is an efﬁcient patient equilibrium. Of
course full efﬁciency is not possible with a ﬁnite amount of in-
formation aggregation. This shows that the limit equilibria are
not determined by the assumptions that the limit distribution
of the signals is a ﬁxed pair of diffusions and that the τ and  
both go to zero. Finally, by allowing the variance of the trinomials
to converge to a common limit as τ and   go to zero, we can con-
structasequence ofgames withanefﬁcientlimitequilibriumeven
though the limit information structure—a diffusion with common
volatilities—has only a trivial equilibrium. To simplify the pre-
sentation, we restrict attention to the case where both diffusions
have zero drift, but this is not important for the results.
To begin, consider τ( ) =  . Because the bad action has a
higher volatility, and the two actions both have zero means, the
best equilibrium payoff for period length τ =   can be attained
with a strategy that punishes with some positive probability π( )
following the signals +h and −h and punishes with probability
zero when the signal is 0. (The likelihood ratio for punishing
on 0 is less than one, and the symmetry of the problem means
that treating +h and −h symmetrically is one of the solutions to
the linear programming problem that deﬁnes the optimum.) Such
strategies have a signal-to-noise ratio
ρ =
q
p
− 1 =
1 − α−1
1 − α+1
− 1 =
¯ γσ2
−1
¯ γσ2
+1
− 1 =
σ2
−1 − σ2
+1
σ2
+1
,
independent of ¯ γ, γ,  ,a n dπ( ). If π is a constant independent
of   then p = π(1 − α+1) is independent of   as well. Hence by
Corollary 1c these strategies support a nontrivial limit equilib-
rium for interest rate r if the ratio, σ2
−1/σ2
+1, is sufﬁciently large.
Moreover, the simple form of the observation structure here lets
us compute the best limit equilibrium payoff: Because no choice
of cutoff can yield a higher value of ρ than
σ2
−1 − σ2
+1
σ2
+1
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the best limit equilibrium payoff is
¯ u−
σ2
+1
σ2
−1 − σ2
+1
g.
Now consider τ = 2 . Here the most informative test is to
punish only if the outcome is +2h or −2h. This has
ρ =
((1 − α−1)/2)2
((1 − α+1)/2)2 − 1 =
(1 − α−1)2
(1 − α+1)2 − 1 =
 
σ2
−1
σ2
+1
 2
− 1
independent of  , and because the punishment probability is also
independent of   we again have a nontrivial equilibrium. More-
over, because the maximal value of ρ (consistent with nonzero
punishment probability) has increased, aggregating two signals
allows a better limit equilibrium payoff.
Now consider the case τ =  1/2 such that k( ) =  −1/2 →∞
as   → 0. Here we make use of the following more general result:
PROPOSITION 5. In the bad-news case (σ−1/σ+1 > 1), if lim →0
τ( )/  =∞there is an efﬁcient limit equilibrium.
Proof. Our previous paper showed that there is an efﬁcient
limit equilibrium when players observe the state of a bad news
diffusion process; the proof uses that fact and a continuity argu-
menttoconstructasequenceofequilibriasatisfyingtheconditions
of Corollary 2c. See Appendix V for details.
COROLLARY 4. There are sequences of information structures with
efﬁcient limit equilibrium where players observe the sum of
discrete events, and these sums converge to a pair of diffu-
sions with the same volatilities.
Proof. The idea is to use a diagonalization argument to ob-
tain a sequence of trinomials where the ratio of variances goes
to 1 sufﬁciently slowly so that there is an efﬁcient limit. To do
this, consider a sequence {σ2
−1n/σ2
+1n}↓ n 1 and to each (σ2
−1n,σ2
+1n)
associate a trinomial signal structure distribution {Sn }  as de-
ﬁned above, so that the sum of the public signal under information
structure Sn,  converges to a pair of diffusions with drift 0 and
volatilities σ2
−1,σ2
+1.L e tGn  be the game with event frequency
1/ , information structure Sn , and period length τ( ) =  1/2.
From Proposition 5, for any sequence of strictly positive εn → 0,250 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
there is a sequence of PPE Pn  for the Gn  with limit payoff ¯ u− εn
as   → 0.
Nowwediagonalize:Foreachj,pick j sothat Pj j haspayoff
at least ¯ u− 2εj;l e tGj ≡ Gj j be the corresponding game; then the
sequence of games {Gj} has a sequence of PPE Pj j with payoffs
converging to ¯ u.
This shows that conclusions based on the hypothesis that
the variances are equal in the limit do not apply to the limit of
the equilibria along the sequence without additional information,
such as the rate at which the variances become equal.
V.B. Good-News Case σ2
−1 <σ 2
+1
Once again, we simplify by setting the drifts equal to 0, and
begin with the case τ( ) =  . The optimal equilibrium with this
signal structure prescribes punishment with positive probability
when Zj = 0 and zero probability on +h,−h, so the signal-to-noise
ratio is
ρ =
q − p
p
=
γσ2
+1 − σ2
−1
(γ − 1)σ2
+1
− 1 =
σ2
+1 − σ2
−1
(γ − 1)σ2
+1
.
This is independent of  , but not independent of γ, even though
γ is not pinned down by the limit diffusion. As we will see, γ will
matter not only for the limit equilibria in the case of no informa-
tion aggregation, but also for whether the best limit equilibrium
payoff is improved by increased aggregation.
FromProposition1anecessaryconditionforanontriviallimit
equilibrium is
σ2
+1 − σ2
−1
(γ − 1)σ2
+1
> g/(¯ u− u).
Note that ρ →∞as γ → 1. This is because when γ = 1, out-
come 0 has probability zero under action +1, so incentives can be
provided at no cost. Conversely, ρ → 0a sγ →∞ , because in this
case outcome 0 occurs with probability near one regardless of the
choice of action.
An argument similar to that of the previous section shows
that when there is a nontrivial limit equilibrium, the best limit
equilibrium payoff is ¯ u−
(γ−1)σ2
−1
σ2
+1−σ2
−1
g. With this case as a baseline we
now investigate the effect of information aggregation on the limit
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The simplest case of information aggregation is τ( ) = 2 .
Because agents only observe the sum of the two periods’ outcomes,
the possible signals take the values {−2,−1,0,1,2}. As before, the
payoffs in the optimal limit equilibria will depend on the highest
possible limiting value of ρ = (q/p) − 1, so we want to determine
the maximal value of q/p.
Even without a thorough analysis, it is immediate that ag-
gregation hurts when γ = 1: Here when τ =  , p = 0, ρ =∞ ,
and the equilibrium is fully efﬁcient, whereas clearly p > 0w h e n
τ( ) = 2 , so that the highest attainable ρ is ﬁnite and thus the
limit equilibrium payoff is bounded away from efﬁciency.
At the other extreme, where γ →∞ ,w eh a v ep = q = 1w h e n
τ =  ,s ot h a tρ = 0 and there is only the trivial equilibrium.
In this case, aggregating two signals could in principle lead to a
higher value of ρ and a better limit equilibrium payoff. Appendix
V gives a detailed analysis of this case and shows that for some
parameter conﬁgurations, aggregating two signals does indeed
lead to a better limit equilibrium payoff, speciﬁcally in the case
where γ is very large and the short-run gain to deviating, g, is very
small.
Now consider the case τ( ) =  1/2, where the signals ob-
served by the players in each period converge to a pair of dif-
fusions. It is important to note that the properties of the limiting
diffusion, and thus its limit equilibria, are independent of γ. Thus
byspecifying
σ+1−σ−1
σ−1 > g/(¯ u− u)(sothereisanontriviallimitequi-
librium for the diffusion) and γ large we can construct examples
where there is only the trivial equilibrium when τ =   and a
nontrivial limit when players aggregate inﬁnitely many signals,
whereas by specifying γ near 1, and σ−1 near σ+1,w eh a v ee x -
amples with a nontrivial limit when τ =   and a trivial limit
when players observe the diffusion. Thus there is no necessary
connection between the equilibrium sets in the two cases, and
the parameters of the limit diffusion are not sufﬁcient to deter-
mine the nature of the equilibrium set when players observe each
realization of the underlying process.
We should also point out that when 0 <
σ+1−σ−1
σ−1 < g/(¯ u− u),
so that the volatilities are in the interior of the range where the
diffusion case has only trivial limit equilibria, necessarily any
sequence {(σ2
+1n,σ2
−1n)}→ n (σ2
+1,σ2
−1) will eventually lie in the in-
terior of this range as well. We conjecture that we could thus use
the large-deviations arguments of Appendix III to show that any
sequence of trinomials with variances converging to σ2
+1,σ2
−1 as252 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
  → 0 will have only trivial equilibria. This result would leave
open the question of whether the same conclusion holds for all
processes that converge to the speciﬁed pair of diffusions.
V.C. Equal Variance, Unequal Mean
Finally we turn to trinomials with equal variances and un-
equal means; this case will be very similar to the binomial case
we discussed in Section IV. As there, we suppose that the bad
action has a higher mean. With equal variances, α−1 = α+1,s o
α = (γ − 1)/γ; the standard binomial case corresponds to γ = 1
and α = 0.
We begin with the case τ =  . Here the best equilibria
punish when the outcome is +h which has probability βi( ) =
1−αi
2 +
µi 1/2
2¯ γ 1/2 ,s o
q
p
=
γ −1/2(1 − α) + µ−1 1/2
γ −1/2(1 − α) + µ+1 1/2 =
σγ−1/2 + µ−1 1/2
σγ−1/2 + µ+1 1/2
=
σ + µ−1 1/2γ 1/2
σ + µ+1 1/2γ 1/2.
Note that as   → 0, q/p → 1, just as in the binomial case, and as
there, the underlying per-event signal becomes completely unin-
formative in the limit. As in the proof of Proposition 4, this implies
that there is only the trivial equilibrium with any ﬁxed level of
aggregation, that is, when τ = k . By analogy with our other re-
sults, we believe that this is also true when limτ→0 τ/ =∞ ,b u t
because the result does not apply to sequences where the vari-
ances are only equal in the limit, we have not tried to provide a
formal proof.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Many different arrays converge to a given diffusion process,
and the limit equilibria of these arrays is not in general deter-
mined by the parameters of the limiting diffusions, but bino-
mial arrays are an exception to this result. Thus the equilibria
of continuous-time games where players monitor the state of a
diffusion process are perhaps best thought of as applying to cases
where the diffusion speciﬁcation is either exact or arises from
aggregating binomial events.
We have assumed throughout that players observe the ag-
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idea that the diffusion comes from aggregation. If instead players
do not merely see the aggregate, but observe the entire empirical
cumulative distribution, they get the ﬁrst-best limit payoff when
volatilities are different and τ/ →∞regardless of the ratio of
the volatilities. This parallels the observation that observing the
inﬁnite-dimensional path of a diffusion for a ﬁnite time interval
reveals its volatility, which is what underlies the folk wisdom in
the continuous time literature that any difference in volatilities
leads to full efﬁciency. However, this full-revelation argument re-
quires that the entire path of the diffusion process be observed,
and in many applications, only the aggregate is available as a
public signal. For example, ﬁrms may have access to one another’s
revenues or sales data through annual reports, which may pos-
sibly disaggregate down to the quarterly level, but ﬁrms do not
generally have access to the individual sales data of their competi-
tors, which are highly proprietary. Similarly, government reports
many aggregates, ranging from money supply ﬁgures to GDP to
hours worked, but the disaggregated data are quite closely held.
APPENDIX I: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
PROPOSITION A.1. The most favorable PPE payoff v∗ is the largest
value v for which there is a function w: Z → R such that (v,w)
satisﬁes the constraints
v = (1 − δ)¯ u+ δ
 
w(z) f(z |+ 1)dz
v ≥ (1 − δ)(¯ u+ g) + δ
 
w(z) f(z |− 1)dz (C)
v ≥ w(z) ≥ u
or v = u if no solution exists.
This result was asserted but not proved in Fudenberg and
Levine (2007a). It was used to prove what is Proposition 1 in this
paper,soaproofisneededtosupportoursubsequentanalysis.The
reason a proof is needed is that the conclusion of the theorem ap-
plies to both pure and mixed equilibria, but only pure actions are
considered in the program (C). This simpliﬁcation is possible only
because the existence of a public randomizing device implies that254 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
any payoff w(z) between v∗ and u can be attained by randomizing
between the two equilibria.
Proof. We need to show that it is sufﬁcient to consider pure
actions. Suppose that the best PPE for the long-run player gives
more than the static Nash payoff, and ﬁx an equilibrium that
attains this payoff. In the ﬁrst period of this equilibrium, the
short-run player must play In with positive probability, so the
long-run player must play +1 with positive probability. Fix such
an equilibrium, and suppose that the short-run player plays Out
with positive probability in the ﬁrst period. Because the short-run
player’s actions are observed, the strategy proﬁle where LR plays
as in the original equilibrium and SR plays In with probability
1 in the ﬁrst period and follows the original strategies thereafter
is a PPE in which LR has a higher payoff, which shows that SR
does not randomize in the ﬁrst period of the best equilibrium.
Finally, if the long-run player randomizes in the ﬁrst period, the
conditions in (C) apply to every action in the support of the ﬁrst-
period distribution, so the maximized value can be attained with
a pure strategy. Finally, observe that we require only v ≥ w(z) ≥ u
because any payoff between the best and worst can be attained
with public randomization.
APPENDIX II: BINOMIAL CONVERGENCE TO DIFFUSIONS
Here we prove some results about the convergence of binomi-
als to diffusions needed in proving Proposition 3 in Appendix III.
PROPOSITION A.2. Suppose that the signals are sums of i.i.d. bi-
nomials Zj( ), where the common outcomes are x( ) > y( ),
and that the probability of x( ) under action i =+ 1,−1i s
αi( ) with lim →0 αi( ) = αi,0 <α i < 1. If under each action
i the sums
  t/  
j=1 Zj( ) converge to a diffusion with drift µi
and volatilities σ2
i as   → 0, then σ+1 = σ−1.
Proof. First we examine what it means for the sum of the
Zj( ) to converge to a diffusion under action +1. It is convenient
to replace the parameters x, y with the parameters µ 
+1,σ 
+1 > 0,
where
x( ) = µ 
+1  + σ 
+1 1/2
 
1 − α+1( )
α+1( )
 1/2
y( ) = µ 
+1  − σ 
+1 1/2
 
α+1( )
1 − α+1( )
 1/2
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Withthisnewparameterization,wecancalculatethat E+1Zj( ) =
µ 
+1  and var+1Zj( ) = (σ 
+1)2 .
If the limit process is a diffusion, then its position at t
has the normal distribution with mean µ+1 and variance σ2
+1.
With the reparameterization, this is equivalent to µ 
+1 → µ+1
and σ 
+1 → σ+1. As an illustration, consider the standard bino-
mial limit discussed in Section IV: Here we have x =− y = σ+1 1/2
and α+1 = (1 + µ+1 1/2/σ+1)/2, so µ 
+1 = µ+1 and (σ 
+1)2 = (σ+1)2 −
(µ+1)2/ 1/  .
Now we examine a second sequence of binomial distributions
that converges to a different diffusion process with mean µ−1 and
variance σ2
−1. As we discussed earlier, it is important that this
second sequence has the same increments x( ), y( ); otherwise,
a single realization could be fully informative. So we now have
x( ) = µ 
+1 +σ 
+1 1/2
 
1−α+1( )
α+1( )
=µ 
−1 +σ 
−1 1/2
 
1−α−1( )
α−1( )
y( ) = µ 
+1 −σ 
+1 1/2
 
α+1( )
1−α+1( )
=µ 
−1 −σ 
−1 1/2
 
α−1( )
1−α−1( )
.
(3)
We now solve this system to see the possible values of σ 
−1,α −1( )
as a function of σ 
+1,µ  
+1,µ  
−1,α +1( ):
 
µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
 
  + σ 
+1
 
1 − α+1( )
α+1( )
= σ 
−1
 
1 − α−1( )
α−1( )
 
µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
 
  − σ 
+1
 
α+1( )
1 − α+1( )
=− σ 
−1
 
α−1( )
1 − α−1( )
.
Divide the two equations to eliminate σ 
−1, solve for α−1( ), and
plug back into the second equation to ﬁnd
σ 
−1 =


 
µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
 
  + σ 
+1
 
1 − α+1( )
α+1( )


×
           
σ 
+1
 
α+1( )
1−α+1( ) −
 
µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
 
 
σ 
+1
 
1−α+1( )
α+1( ) +
 
µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
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Because lim →0 αi( ) = αi,0 <α i < 1, and it follows that σ 
−1 →
σ+1.
LEMMA A.1. Suppose that the signals are sums of i.i.d. binomi-
als Zj( ) where the common outcomes are x( ) > y( ), and
that the probability of x( ) under action i =+ 1,−1i sαi( )
with lim →0 αi( ) = αi,0 <α i < 1. If under each action i the
sums
  t/  
j=1 Zj( ) converge to a diffusion with drift µi and
volatilities σ2
i as   → 0, then
lim
 →0
    
σ 
+1
 2 −
 
σ 
−1
 2   
 1/5 = 0.
Proof. Because
    
σ 
+1
 2 −
 
σ 
−1
 2   
 1/5 =
   σ 
+1 − σ 
−1
      σ 
+1 + σ 
−1
   
 1/5
and |σ 
+1 + σ 
−1|→2σ+1, this is the same as |σ 
+1 − σ 
−1|/ 1/5 → 0,
so
   σ 
+1 − σ 
−1
   
 1/5
=
 
         
σ 
+1 −1/5 −

 
µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
 
 3/10 +  −1/5σ 
+1
 
1 − α+1( )
α+1( )


×
         
 
σ 
+1
 
α+1( )
1−α+1( ) −
 
µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
 
 1/2
σ 
+1
 
1−α+1( )
α+1( ) +
 
µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
 
 1/2
       
       
.
Algebraic manipulation leads to
lim
 →0
   σ 
+1 − σ 
−1
   
 1/5 = lim
 →0
σ 
+1
   µ 
+1 − µ 
−1
    1/10   2α+1( ) − 1
   
α+1
 
σ 
+1
 
1−α+1( )
α+1( )
 
2
 
σ 
+1
 
1−α+1( )
α+1( )
 
=
|µ+1 − µ−1|
2σ+1
lim
 →0
 1/10 |2α+1( ) − 1|
 
α+1(1 − α+1( ))
.
Because lim →0 αi( ) = αi,0 <α i < 1, the result follows.REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 257
Using the central limit theorem, the conditions µ 
+1 →
µ+1,σ 
+1 → σ+1 and α+1( ) → α+1,0 <α +1 < 1 can be shown to
be sufﬁcient for a triangular array to converge to a diffusion.
To construct a nonstandard binomial array with the probabili-
ties of the two steps not converging to 1/2, it is convenient to
set µ 
+1 = µ+1,σ 
+1 = σ+1,α +1( ) = α+1. Using our alternative pa-
rameterization from above, we ﬁnd, for example, that if µ+1 =
0,σ +1 = 1,α +1 = 1/3, we have the binomial taking on the values
x( ) =
√
2 1/2, y( ) =− (
√
2/2) 1/2 with probability of x( ) equal
to 1/3, which generate a triangular array that converges to a dif-
fusion with drift 0 and volatility 1.
APPENDIX III: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
As in the text, we consider a sequence of games with both the
event period   and the observation period τ( ) converging to 0,
and deﬁne k( ) = τ( )/ . Note that condition (i) of Proposition 3
requires that lim →0 k( ) =∞ ; we will maintain that restriction
throughout this Appendix. We start by summarizing some nota-
tion and key results from other places. Recall that when players
observe the state of a diffusion process at discrete intervals, the
signals are normally distributed; let  ,φ respectively denote the
c.d.f. and density of the standard normal distribution.
Fact A.1 [Fudenberg and Levine 2007a, Proposition 2]. Sup-
pose the signals are normally distributed with means −a1τ and
variance σ2τ. Then for any ρ0 > 0, ρ>ρ 0 implies q/τ → 0a n ds o
there is no nontrivial limit equilibrium.
For a ﬁxed distribution F, let ψF(ζ) ≡ log
  ∞
−∞ eζxF(dx)b et h e
logarithm of the generating function. We will be interested in the
distributions corresponding to the binomial distributions referred
to in Proposition 3: In this case we have
ψ (ζ) = log
 
α eζx( ) + (1 − α )e−ζy( ) 
.
Fact A.2 [Large Deviations Theorem for Triangular Arrays,
from Fudenberg and Levine (2007b)]. Suppose that for each n
there is a sequence Zn
i j = 1,...,n of i.i.d. random variables with
zeromean,varianceσ2
n,anddistribution Fn,andthatzn =
 n
j=1 Zn
j
has distribution Fn∗, whereas the normalized sum zn/σn
√
n has
distribution Fn.I f258 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
1. for some ¯ s > 0a n da l l0 ≤ ζ ≤ ¯ s there is a continu-
ous function ψ2(ζ) > 0 and constant B > 0 such that
limn→∞ sup0≤ζ≤¯ s |ψ  
n(ζ) − ¯ ¯ ψ(ζ)|→0a n ds u p 0≤ζ≤¯ s |ψ   
n (ζ)|,
|ψ    
n (ζ)ζ||ψ     
n (ζ)ζ2| < B
2. σn → σ, M3n ≡ E|Zi
n|3 → M3 < ∞
3. n−1/6xn → 0
4. xn →∞
then
1 − Fn(xn)
1 −  (xn)
→ 1.
In what follows, we will take the limit on k →∞rather than
  → 0, implicitly considering a sequence τk → 0, with  k = τk/k
and Zk
j = Zj( k).15 As in the proof of Proposition 2, we deﬁne new
parameters µk
i = EiZk
j,( σk
i )2 = variZk
j/ k.
We are interested in applying the Large Deviation Theorem
to ˆ zk ≡
 k
j=1 Zk
j.T h i sl e a d su st od e ﬁ n e
˜ Zk
ij =
Zk
j − µk
i k
√
 k
so that E ˜ Zk
ij = 0,var ˜ Zk
ij = (σk
i )2 → σ2
i and the values taken on by
the reparameterized binomial are
˜ xk
i = σk
i
 
1 − αi( k)
αi( k)
 1/2
,
˜ yk
i =− σk
i
 
αi( k)
1 − αi( k)
 1/2
.
Note that limk→∞ xk
i = σi: the reparameterized binomial has step
size tending to a nonzero constant.
LEMMA A.2. Consider two i.i.d. binomials Zj( ) with common out-
comes x( ) > y( ), where the probability of x( ) under action
i =+ 1,−1i sαi( ) with lim →0 αi( ) = αi,0 <α i < 1. If un-
der each action i the sums of i.i.d. binomials
  t/  
j=1 Zj( ) con-
verges to a diffusion with drift µi and volatilities σ2
i as   → 0,
then the reparameterized binomials satisfy conditions 1 and
2 of the large deviations theorem for both i =− 1,+1.
15. We write kas a superscript, as the subscript denotes the actioni =+ 1,−1.REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 259
Proof. We consider the casei =+ 1; the casei =− 1 is identical
save for notation. The cumulant generating function for +1i s
ψk(ζ) = log
 
α+1( k)exp
 
ζσk
i
 
1 − α+1( k)
α+1( k)
 1/2 
+(1 − α+1( k))exp
 
−ζσk
i
 
α+1( k)
1 − α+1( k)
   
.
Let
ˆ ψ(ζ) = log
 
α+1 exp
 
ζσi
 
1 − α+1
α+1
 1/2 
+(1 − α+1)exp
 
−ζσi
 
α+1
1 − α+1
   
.
Because α+1( k) → α+1 and σk
i → σi, we know that limk→∞
sup0≤ζ≤¯ s |ψ  
k(ζ) − ˆ ψ  (ζ)|→0, so the ﬁrst part of condition 1 is
satisﬁed, and it is clear by inspection that the other necessary
conditions hold as well.
We turn now to the main proof. The idea is to show that if
there were strategies that led to a nontrivial limit equilibrium in
the binomial case, we could construct a nontrivial limit equilib-
rium when players observe the position of a diffusion. There are
several details that need to be attended to in order for this argu-
ment to work. First, the approximating normals corresponding to
the two different actions will have different variances, whereas
Fact A.1 supposes that the variances are equal before the limit is
reached. Lemma A.1 adds a condition on the rate of convergence
that enables us to extend Fact A.1 to the case where the variances
are different before the limit is reached. Moreover, although we
know that within each period z is converging to a normal, the
cutoff for punishment might be going to inﬁnity, so the standard
central limit theorem does not apply. Hence we use the large de-
viation theorem described above. The idea is to show that if the
cutoff grows faster than k1/6 the probability of punishment is so
low that it cannot sustain a nontrivial equilibrium, whereas if it
grows at k1/6 the normal approximation is so good that we can
make use of Fact A.1.
First we give a lemma needed to deal with variances that are
unequal before the limit is reached.260 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
LEMMA A.3. Suppose σn → σ,a n dt h a tζ2
n|σ2
n − ˜ σ2
n|→0. Then
1 −  
 ζn−µ
σn
 
1 −  
 ζn−µ
˜ σn
  → 1.
Proof. Observe from L’Hˆ opital’s rule that if x →∞then (1 −
 (x))/φ(x) → 0. Using that fact, we may again apply L’Hˆ opital’s
rule to see that limx→∞ x(1 −  (x))/φ(x) = 1. Deﬁne
xn =
ζn − µ
σn
and ˜ xn =
˜ ζn − µ
σn
.
Then
lim
n→∞
1 −  
 ζn−µ
σn
 
1 −  
 ζn−µ
˜ σn
  = lim
n→∞
1 −  (xn)
1 −  (˜ xn)
= lim
n→∞
(1 −  (xn))
φ(xn)
xn(1− (xn))
(1 −  (˜ xn))
φ(˜ xn)
˜ xn(1− (˜ xn))
= lim
n→∞
˜ xnφ (xn)
xnφ (˜ xn)
= lim
n→∞
σn
˜ σn
exp


 ζn−µ
˜ σn
 2 −
 ζn−µ
σn
 2
2


= lim
n→∞exp
  
σ2
n − ˜ σ2
n
 
(ζn − µ)
2
2σ2
n ˜ σ2
n
 
= 1.
LEMMA A.4. When the signal is the sum of binomials with com-
mon support, and action −1 has a higher mean, the monotone
likelihood ratio property is satisﬁed for the pair of signals.
Proof. This is well known and can be veriﬁed by directly
calculating the likelihood ratio for the multinomial sum of
binomials.
Deﬁne the random variable normalized for the agent taking
action +1a s
˜ zk
+1 ≡
ˆ zk
+1 − µk
+1 kk
σk
+1
√
k k =
 k
j=1 ˜ Zk
ij
σk
+1
√
k
.
Because the MLRP is satisﬁed, we may assume a strategy of the
form “punish” if ˜ zk
+1 > ¯ ζk.REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 261
LEMMA A.5. If liminfk→∞ ¯ ζkk−1/6 > 0a n dτkexp(k2/7) → 0t h e n
p/τ → 0, q/τ → 0.
Proof. It sufﬁces to prove q/τ → 0 because q ≥ p. To compute
q, we need to consider the distribution of ˜ zk
+1 when the action
taken is −1. This does not have zero mean or unit variance, so we
renormalize, deﬁning ˜ zk
−1
σk
+1
σk
−1
˜ zk
+1 − (µk
−1 − µk
+1) kk, which has zero
mean and unit variance when the action taken is −1. Denote the
c.d.f. of this random variable when the action is −1b yGk;w em a y
potentiallyapplythelargedeviationstheoremtothisdistribution.
In the new normalization, the cutoff is
xk =
σk
+1
σk
−1
¯ ζk −
 
µk
−1 − µk
+1
 
 kk
so that qk = 1 − Gk(xk). However, because lim ¯ ζkk−1/6 > 0, |σk
+1 −
σk
−1|→0, and µk
i is bounded, we see that limk→∞ xkk−1/6 > 0.
H e n c ew es e t¯ xk = k1/7√
2π, and because k−1/6¯ xk → 0, we know
that ¯ xk ≤ xk for large enough k, and that the conditions 3 and 4 of
the large deviations theorem above are satisﬁed for ¯ xk. It follows
that for k sufﬁciently large, q ≤ 2(1 −  (¯ xk)). Next use L’Hˆ opital’s
rule to see that 1− (¯ xk)
φ(¯ xk) → 0, so for large enough k we have
q ≤ 3φ(¯ xk) = 3exp
 
−
 
¯ xk 2
2π
  √
2π.
Because ¯ xk = k1/7√
2π,w eh a v et h a tp/τ ≤ C(τ exp(k2/7))
→ 0.
Now we can prove Proposition 3, which we restate for conve-
nience.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose
(i) lim →0 τ( )exp(k( )2/7) →∞
(ii) the signals are sums of i.i.d. binomials Zj( ) where the
common outcomes are x( ) > y( ), and the probability of
x( ) under action i =+ 1,−1i sαi( ) with lim →0 αi( ) =
αi,0 <α i < 1
(iii) under each action i,
  t/  
j=1 Zj( ) converges to a nondegen-
erate diffusion with drifts µi and volatilities σ2
i .
Then all limit equilibria are trivial.262 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Proof. By Lemma A.4, the signals satisfy the MLRP, so we
can restrict attention to strategies that punish when the observed
signal exceeds some cutoff. By Lemma A.5, if there is a nontrivial
limit, we may assume that the cutoff satisﬁes limk→∞ ¯ ζkk−1/6 = 0.
By Lemma A.2 and Fact A.2, this means that we may com-
pute p/τ,q/τ,ρ asymptotically using normal distributions. From
Lemma A.1,
lim
k→∞
   
 
 
σk
+1
 2 −
 
σk
−1
 2   
 
(τ/k)1/5 = 0,
so that limk→∞ k1/5|(σk
+1)2 − (σk
−1)2|=0 because limk→∞ ¯ ζkk−1/6 =
0, limk→∞ ¯ ζkk−1/5 = 0 and so limk→∞ ¯ ζk|(σk
+1)2 − (σk
−1)2|=0. Con-
sequently Lemma A.3 applies, so that we may assume that the
normals have the same variance, implying a nontrivial limit in
that case. This contradicts Fact A.1.
APPENDIX IV: AGGREGATING TWO GOOD-NEWS SIGNALS
We want to show that aggregating two trinomial good-news
signals leads to a better limit equilibrium payoff when γ is very
large and the short-run gain to deviating, g, is very small. To
do this we determine the best limit equilibrium payoff when two
signals are aggregated.
Punishing when the sum of the signals is −2o r+2 will min-
imize and not maximize the target ratio, and with a 0 mean the
signals −1a n d+1 are symmetric. Thus it will be enough to deter-
mine q/p f o rt h es i g n a l s0a n d+1. To do this we ﬁrst calculate q
and p for these two signals. Note that for i = 1,−1,
Pr
i
   
j=1,2
Zj = 0
 
= Pr{(0,0),(h,−h),(−h,h)}
= α2
i + 2
 
1 − αi
2
 2
=
3
2
α2
i +
1
2
− αi.
This is minimized at αi = 1/3, where it has value 1/3. Next
Pri(
 
j=1,2 Zj = 1) = αi(1 − αi) = αi − α2
i . This is maximized at
1/2.REPEATED GAMES WITH FREQUENT SIGNALS 263
Thus if the strategies punish when the sum is 1, q/p =
α−1−α2
−1
α+1−α2
+1
= B, and if the strategies punish when the sum is 0, we
have q/p =
3α2
−1+1−2α−1
3α2
+1+1−2α+1 = A.
To compare max(A, B) to the likelihood ratio C = α−1/α+1 for
a single observation, we ﬁrst compare B and C:
B
C
=
α−1−α2
−1
α+1−α2
+1
α−1
α+1
=
1 − α−1
1 − α+1
< 1,
so unsurprisingly (0,1) and (1,0) are less informative than (0).
Next, we ask when A< C. This is true when
3α2
−1+1−2α−1
3α2
+1+1−2α+1 <
α−1/α+1.
Notethatα−1 >α +1 becauseweareinthegood-newscase.Ob-
serving that all the expressions are nonnegative, we can write this
as
3α2
−1+1−2α−1
α−1 <
3α2
+1+1−2α+1
α+1 . The same function, f(α) = 3α2+1−2α
α ,
appears on both the left- and right-hand sides of this inequal-
ity. Its derivative is f  (α) = 6α2−2α−3α2−1+2α
α2 ,s o f  (1) > 0, and thus
when α+1 <α −1 and both are sufﬁciently close to 1, we have
f(α−1) > f(α+1); because α+1,α −1 → 1a sγ →∞ , aggregating two
signals together improves the best likelihood ratio as γ →∞ .O n
the other hand, the maximized value of this likelihood decreases
to 1 as γ →∞ . Thus for some payoff functions, the values of γ
for which aggregating two signals improves the likelihood ratio
may be so large that even with two signals there is only a triv-
ial limit equilibrium. On the other hand, aggregation can allow a
switch from nontrivial to trivial limits if both γ is very large and
g is very small, so that
σ2
+1−σ2
−1
(γ−1)σ2
+1
= g/(¯ u− u), and the one-period
likelihood ratio is just on the edge of the region that supports a
nontrivial limit.
APPENDIX V: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
PROPOSITION 5. In the bad-news case (σ−1/σ+1 > 1) if lim →0
τ( )/  =∞then there is an efﬁcient limit equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the strategy of punishing whenever the ab-
solute value of z ≡
  t/  
j=1 Zj( ) exceeds a threshold z∗or equiva-
lently when the absolute value of ζ(τ) = z/σ+1τ1/2 exceeds ζ∗ =
z∗/σ+1τ1/2. The proof of Proposition 4 of Fudenberg and Levine
(2007a) shows that when the observed outcomes correspond to264 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
observing the limit diffusions, specifying a ﬁxed and large value
of ζ∗ makes p(τ) a constant independent of τ and limτ→0 q(τ)/p(τ)
as large as we like. Let q∗(τ), p∗(τ) denote the values of q and
p computed when players observe the position of the limit diffu-
sions and use strategies with a ﬁxed normalized cutoff ζ∗,a n d
let q (τ)(τ), p (τ)(τ) denote the punishment probabilities when the
outcomes correspond to observing the sum of τ/ (τ) draws of the
Z  and the same cut-off rule is used. Because we have assumed
that lim →0 τ( )/  =∞ , and the cutoff ζ∗ is ﬁxed relative to the
standard errors, we can apply the central limit theorem to con-
clude these probability distributions converge to a normal, so we
obtain the same limit values of ρ = (q − p)/palong the triangular
arrays corresponding to τ( ) as we do in the diffusion limit. Con-
sequently, the proof from the earlier paper’s Proposition 4 shows
that there is an efﬁcient limit equilibrium.
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